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My suuting point is a question: In what way, if at 
all, are human beings unique in creation? In the past, 
there have been almost too many answers to thatquestion. 
A whole range of unique and crucial differences has 
been canvassed: humans alone have rationality, culture, 
language; humans alone are persons, the possessors of 
an immortal soul; humans alone are self-conscious and 
are solely capable of sentient existence. Humans alone 
are capable ofpraising God and entering into relationship 
with the divine. There seems no end to the possibilities 
of uniqueness which humans can contemplate for 
themselves when they compare themselves to other 
species. The notion of the image ofGod has furthered an 
extensive uniqueness-searching anthropology which has 
dominated Christian tradition for centuries, irritating one 
distinguished Hebrew scholar, James Barr, into denying 
that the notion of the image refers to anything tangible at 
all, referring to such attempts as "the blood-out-of-a-stone 
process."l 
There are at least three reasons why theology should 
be suspicious of this uniqueness-spotting tendency. 
The first and most obvious is that a good number of 
these differences have turned out to be not so unique 
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after all. For example, few now share the conviction of 
Aquinas that only humans in creation are capable of 
rationality or intelligence in its broadest sense. Even 
fewer now share the enthusiasm of Descartes for the 
view that animals are automata, mechanisms utterly 
devoid of self-consciousness, and therefore incapable 
of feeling pain. An unmistakable sense of caution in 
this regard is registered by Robert Runcie, the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury, in a recent lecture. "[B]oth in 
theory and practice the boundaries of the human family 
are becoming unclear," he argues. Behind practical 
dilemmas, 
there lies the theoretical difficulty of defining 
what it is thatdecisively distinguishes the human 
from the non-human - a difficulty that 
increases as, for instance, naturalists detect in 
non-human creatures subtleties ofbehaviour and 
complexities of communication which, until 
recently, would have been thought unique and 
exclusive of humans.2 
Then there may be a question as to why humans find 
it necessary to place themselves in a distinct category 
from animals. One of the conclusions of Desmond 
Morris' popular book, ~~ Am;., which aroused 
most Christian commentators to complain, was his 
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insistence that our desire to be placed above the animals 
was itself a sign of insecurity. "Unfortunately, because 
we are so powerful and so successful when compared 
with other animals, we fmd the contemplation of our 
humble origins somehow offensive, so that Ido not expect 
to be thanked for what I have done," he wrote. 
Our climb to the top has been a get-rich-quick 
story, and, like all nouveaux riches, we are very 
sensitive about our background. We are also in 
constant danger of betraying it3 
To these suspicions needs to beadded a third, namely 
that the distinctions we have drawn have been frequently 
and transparently self-serving, even selfish. Forexample, 
it seems to be altogether too convenient for Aristotle -
to take simply one example - to suppose that since 
"nature makes nothing without some end in view," it 
must follow that nature has made all animals "for the 
sake of man.'''' It has been so easy to turn this appeal to 
the purpose of nature, and in subsequent Christian 
centuries to "divine purpose," into a justification for 
doing what we like to animals that we have come to 
suspect the opposite is the true sequence. Aquinas, 
following Aristotle, appeals both to the order of nature 
and also to divine providence to assure us that "it is not 
wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or 
in any other way whatever."s The difference-finding 
tendency in Western tradition has undoubtedly served 
to minimize the moral standing of nonhuman creatures 
and to enable us to exploit them with a clear conscience. 
One cannot be but bemused by the reference in the 
marriage service of the Book QfCommonemm to ''brute 
beasts that hath no understanding," since some, perhaps 
many, higher mammals seem to know more about 
monogamous relationships than at least some members 
of homo sapiens.6 In short: much of our uniqueness-
spotting within the Christian tradition has been linked 
directly or indirectly to the fostering of a low view of 
animality, the traces of which are still found in our 
language about "brutes", "beasts," and "bestial"; even 
the word "animal" has become a libel- and not just on 
human beings. 
In a little but significantbook oftheological fantasy, 
entitled Travels in Oudamovia, John Austin Baker 
describes the traveller's reaction to Oudamovian life and 
worship, which was characterized by a friendly non-
exploitive relationship with animals: 
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The truth they strove to bring home was that 
the world God has given to his creatures, the 
one world which they have to share, is in fact a 
different world to.each one of them, but that the 
world each creature knows is equally true. We 
human beings, superior as we are, ought to be 
very humble because other creatures have other 
truths which we can only dimly grasp, worlds 
we can never fully enter. 
He concludes with this question: 
And if this is so with regard to an ox or an ant, 
not to say a tree or a stone, how can we hope to 
comprehend the God who comprehends them 
all, to whom all worlds and truths are fully 
known because he made them? 7 
This interesting question leads me again to my 
starting point Let me now frame the question in this 
way. Is it possible to have a theological understanding of 
humans as unique which avoids the suspicions and 
dangers of self-service, insecurity, and moral denigration 
of what is different - not to mention a view which 
might broadly be reconcilable with empirical evidence? 
IT 
I begin this second section by laying some stress on 
this word "theological." For it seems that many of the 
previous claims for human uniqueness have been 
essentially naturalistic rather than theological. I mean by 
this that they have appealed to certain abilities, qualities, 
or capacities, such as rationality, or power, or self-
consciousness, which are taken as determinative of what 
is uniquely human. Such attempts I want to suggest are 
not theological in the strict sense of being things which 
are grounded in the nature of God itself. Despite the 
traveller in Oudamovia's not wholly unjust complaint 
that "our understanding of God is even less adequate 
than our understanding of the life of our cat"8, it is here 
that there may be a way forward. 
If we take the gospel narratives seriously, it may be 
that there is at least one thing we can know. It seems 
appropriate to describe this truth in the form ofa story. It 
is from Helen Waddell's Peter Abelard. Peter, you may 
recall, had been made to suffer a terrible injustice from 
people who had taken the law into their own hands. In 
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this passage, Peter is walking close to a wood with his 
friend, Thibault. 
'My God,' said Thibault. 'what's that?' 
From somewhere near them in the woods 
a cry had arisen, a thin cry, of such intolerable 
anguish that Abelard turned dizzy on his feet, 
and caught at the wall. 
'It's a child's voice,' he said. '0 God, are 
they at a child?' 
'A rabbit.' said Thibault. He listened. 
'There's nothing worrying it It'll be in a trap. 
Hugh told me he was putting them down. 
Christ!' The scream came yet again. 
Abelard was beside him, and the two 
plunged down by the bank... '0God', [Abelard] 
was muttering. 'Let it die. Let it die quickly. ' 
But the cry came yet again. On the right, 
this time. He plunged through the thicket 
of hornbeam. 
'Watch out,' said Thibault, thrusting past 
him. 'The trap might take the hand off you.' 
The rabbit stopped shrieking when they 
stooped over, either from exhaustion, or in some 
last extremity of fear. Thibault held the teeth of 
the trap apart, andAbelard gathered up the little 
creature in his hands. It lay for a moment 
breathing quickly, then in some blind 
recognition of the kindness that it met at the 
last, the small head thrust and nestled against 
his arm, and it died. 
It was the last confiding thrust that broke 
Abelard's heart He looked down at the little 
draggled body, his mouth shaking. 'Thibault,' 
he said, 'do you think there is a God at all? 
Whatever has come to me, I earned it But 
what did this one do?' 
Thibault nodded. 
'I know,' he said. 'Only - I think God is 
in it too.' 
Abelard looked up sharply. 
'In it? Do you mean that it makes Him 
suffer, the way it does us?' 
Again Thibault nodded. 
'Then why doesn't He stop it?' 
'I don't know,' said Thibault. 'Unless-
unless it's like the Prodigal Son. I suppose the 
father could have kept him at home against his 
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will. But what would have been the use? All 
this,' he stroked the limp body, 'is because of 
us. But all the time God suffers. More than 
we do.' 
Abelard looked at him, perplexed. 
'Thibault. when did you think of all this?' 
Thimult's foce stiffened. 'It was that night,' 
he said, his voice strangled. 'The things we did 
to poor Guibert He -' Thimult stopped. 'I 
could not sleep for nights and nights. And then 
I saw that God suffered too. And I thought that 
I would like to be a priest. ' 
'Thibault. do you mean Calvary?' 
Thibault shook his head. 'That was only a 
piece of it - the piece that we saw - in time. 
Like that' He JX>inted to a fallen tree beside 
him, sawn through the middle. 'That dark ring 
there, it goes up and down the whole length 
of the tree. But you only see where it is cut 
across. That is what Christ's life was; the bit 
of God that we saw. And we think God is like 
that. because Christ was like that. kind and 
forgiving sins and healing people. We think 
God is like that for ever, because it happened 
once with Christ But not the pain. Not the 
agony at the last We think that stopped.' 
Abelard looked at him, the blunt nose 
and the wide mouth, the honest troubled eyes. 
He could have knelt before him. 'Then, 
Thibault.' he said slowly, 'you think that all 
this,' he looked down at the quiet little body 
in his arms, 'all the pain of the world was 
Christ's cross?' 
'God's cross,' said Thibault. 'And it 
goes on.' 
'The Patripassian heresy,' muttered 
Abelard mechanically. 'But. 0 God, if it were 
bUe. Thibault. it must be. At least, there is 
something at the back of it that is bUe. And if 
we could fmd it - it would bring back the 
whole world. '9 
The JX>int then so ably narrated by Waddell is this: 
God suffers. I shall not be concerned here with the 
precise theories about how God may be thought to suffer. 
Notwithstanding Abelard's "mechanical" description of 
this view as "the Patripassian heresy," it seems to me that 
there are a variety of ways in which we can understand 
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God as suffering presence in the world that do not lose 
sight of divine omnipotence or indeed divine 
transcendence. Even so gospel-rentred a scholar as Tom 
Torrance can be so nervous about an outright declara-
tion of divine passibility that he resolves the problem by 
simply affirming the contradiction: God "redeems our 
passability in his impassability."10 But I want to leave 
that debate to one side, and suggest that the insightderived 
from God's self-definition in Jesus Christ leads 
inescapably to the view that God really and truly enters 
into suffering. This seems to me to be required by a fully 
incarnational theology in which God actually does what 
is claimed - namely enter into the awfulness of the 
human condition. 
But like Thibault in the story, I want to go further. If 
it is true that God is the Creator and sustainer of the 
whole world of life, then it is inconceivable that God is 
not also aco-sufferer in the world ofnonhuman creatures 
as well. Years of Christian tradition has obscured this 
basic implication of the gospel narrative for at least two 
reasons. The first is because the scholastic tradition in 
particular has denied to animals any moral standing, so 
that even ifthey did suffer, such suffering was notregarded 
as morally significant The second, and more obvious 
reason, is that later Christian tradition, especially manifest 
in Cartesianism, simply denied that animals could feel 
pain at all. Even in this century notable theologians, 
such as Charles Raven, argued not just that animals did 
not suffer like humans but rather doubted that they 
suffered at all.11 
And yet the idea that God is affected by the suffering 
of all creatures has not been lost on generations of saints 
and poets. "Here I saw the great unity between Christ 
and us:' writes Julian of Norwich, "for when he was in 
pain, all creatures able to suffer pain suffered with him."12 
It is written of Margery Kempe that "[w]hen she saw a 
CruCifIX, or if she saw a man had a wound, or a beast, or 
if a man beat a child before her, or smote a horse or 
another beast with a whip, she thought she saw Our Lord 
beaten and wounded."13 In this Julian and Kempe may 
have something in common with Cardinal Newman: 
"Think of your feelings at cruelty practiced upon brute 
animals,' writes Newman, "and you will gain the sort of 
feeling which the history of Christ's Cross and Passion 
ought to excite within yoU."14 
Perhaps the best known expression of this idea in 
poetry is found in Joseph Plunkett's I ~ ~~ 
!.I1m~~: 
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I see His blood upon the rose 
And in the stars the glory of His eyes, 
His body gleams amid eternal snows, 
His tears fall from the skies. 
I see His face in every flower, 
The thunder and the singing of the birds 
Are but His voice - and carven by His power 
Rocks are His written words. 
All pathways by His feet are worn, 
His strong heart stirs the ever-beating sea, 
His crown is twinned with every thorn, 
His cross is every tree.1S 
More satisfactory I think is Edith Sitwell's Still Falls 
~&lin. in which she pictures Christ's redeeming blood 
- like rain - continuing to fall on the wounds of the 
suffering world. 
He bears in his Heart all wounds, - those of 
the light that died, 
The last faint spark 
In the self-murdered heart, the wounds of the 
sad uncomprehending dark, 
The wounds of the baited bear, -
The blind and weeping bear whom the 
keepers beat 
On his helpless flesh. . .the tears of the 
hunted hare. 
Still falls in Rain-
Then - 0 I leape up to my God: who pulles 
medoune-
See, see where Christ's blood strearnes in the 
frrmament: 
It flows from the Brow we nailed upon the tree 
Deep to the dying, to the thirsting heart 
That holds the fires of the world, dark smirched 
with pain 
At Caesar's laurel crown. 
Then sounds the voice ofone who like the heart 
of man 
Was once a child who among beasts was lain -
•Still do I love, still shed my innocent light, my 
Blood, for thee.' 16 
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This imaginative picture of Christ suffering all 
pain and violence in the universe that God has made 
conveys - it seems to me - a truth which has simply 
eluded the fonnal theorists and dogmaticians of the 
Christian tradition. Only very faintly, if at all, has the 
church allowed this truth to be expressed in its liturgy. 
For example, in the Byzantine rite for Holy Saturday it 
is held that "[t]he whole creation has altered by thy 
Passion; for all things suffered with thee, knowing 0 
Lord, that thou holdest all things in unity." 17 But this 
splendid example, I fear, is one of the comparatively few 
exceptions to an otherwise almost wholly monolithic 
anthropocentrisrn of East and West 
It seems to me that the recognition that suffering 
exists in the nonhuman world requires us to grapple with 
the problem ofredemption for these spheres as well. Ifit 
is believed, in fidelity to the gospel story, that God truly 
enters into creaturely suffering, then there can be no good 
reason for excluding God's suffering presence from the 
realm of the nonhuman creation as well. Indeed, quite 
the reverse. For the issue is not how much suffering or to 
what degree any being suffers, but that it suffers at all 
which is the underlying fact to be wrestled with. If as 
Bonhoeffer once remarked, "only a suffering God can 
help," it must follow that where there is suffering - no 
matter whatever the kind and to what degree - God 
suffers too. 
Summer 1990 
m 
I now turn to my third section. You may recall 
Thibault's reaction to the question of suffering. Not 
only did he hold that God suffered in all suffering 
creatures, but also, reflecting upon that suffering in 
both humans and animals, he had decided to become 
a priest "And then lsaw that God suffered too," he said. 
"And I thought I would like to be a priest" At first sight 
this might appear to be a rather unusual reaction. It has 
to be said that many prevailing notions of priesthood 
would fmd the relationship, if any, hard to fathom. Yet 
it seems to me that 'Thibaultian theology" (if I may 
describe it so) is altogether coherent For if Christian 
priesthood derives its authority from Christ, as the 
focus of God's own self-definition, then it should 
also follow that priesthood is an extension of the 
suffering, and therefore also redeeming, activity of God 
in our world. 
The one point I want to make here is this: The wider 
defmition of God's presence, and therefore also his 
redeeming power, necessitates in turn a wider definition 
of priesthood. I am by no means the first person to 
think of priesthood in wider, we might say ecological, 
tenns. Alexander Pope in his "Essay on Man" describes 
the divine commission to have dominion and to look 
after the world in tenns of Christian priesthood: 
The state of Nature was the reign of God. ..  
Man walked with beast, jointtenant of the shade; 
The same his table and the same his bed; 
No murder cloth'd him, and no murder fed...  
Unbrib'd, unbloody, stood the blameless priest: 
Heaven's attribute was Universal Care, 
And Man's prerogative to rule, but Spare.18 
One of the fll'St to use the phrase "the World's High 
Priest" was Archbishop Leighton in the seventeenth 
century. He spoke of the priest in the Psalmist's sense of 
offering the praises of all creatures to their God: 
All things indeed declare and speak His 
glory: the Heavens send it forth, and the Earth 
and Sea resound and echo it back. But His 
reasonable creatures hath He peculiarly framed 
both to take notice of His glory in all the rest, 
and to return it from and for all the rest in a 
more express and lively way. 
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And in this lower world it is Man alone 
that is made capable of observing the Glory of 
God, and of offering Him praises. He 
expresses it well who calls man "the World's 
High Priest."19 
Such thoughts are similar to those expressed by 
Coleridge, who in his poem ''ToNature" anticipates some 
of the lyricism, if not the actual lyrics, of Teilhard de 
Chardin's "Mass Upon the Altar of the World.''20 
It may indeed be phantasy when I 
Essay to draw from all created things 
Deep, heartfelt, inward joy that closely clings: 
And trace in leaves and flowers that round 
me lie 
Lessons of love and earnest piety. 
So let it be; and if the wide world rings 
In mock of this belief, to me it brings 
Nor fear, nor grief, nor vain perplexity. 
So will I build my altar in the fields, 
And the blue sky my fretted dome shall be, 
And the sweet fragrance that the wild 
flower yields 
Shall be the incense I will yield to Thee, 
Thee only God! and Thou shalt not despise 
Even me, the priest of this poor sacrifice.21 
This notion ofsacrifice is taken up by George Herbert 
in perhaps the best-known lines of all on this theme: 
Man is the world's High Priest he doth present 
The sacrifice for all; while they below 
Unto the service mutter an assent, 
Such as springs use that fall, and winds 
that blow.22 
Already we see the two familiar themes ofChristian 
priesthood expressing themselves: the priest is the one 
who "present(s)" or represents, and also the one who 
offers up "the sacrifice for all." But what does it mean to 
exercise a representative and sacrificial priesthood for 
the whole created order? Who is representing whom, 
and who is sacrificing what? 
First, I want to suggest that the priest is the icon of 
Christ The priest is to present and represent the love of 
God focused in Jesus Christ "Have this mind among 
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yourselves, which you have in Christ Jesus, who, though 
he was in the form of God, did not count equality with 
God a thing to be grasped, but emptied himself taking 
the form of a servant''23 It is this conception of the 
omnipotence of God expressed in service which 
constitutes the decisive paradigm of how we should 
exercise our lordship or dominion over the nonhuman 
creation. If it is true that the power of God is most 
authentically expressed in the form of suffering service, 
then we have to ask ourselves radical questions about 
how we are to understand our own lordship or dominion 
over nature in general and animals in particular. Ifwe 
are to have among us the mind of the one whose power is 
expressed in humility, in condescension, in reaching 
out to the least of all, has not our own relationship 
to the suffering nonhuman got to undergo a fundamental 
re-examination? Almost alone among contemporary 
theologians, Torrance articulates the connection 
between the suffering world and the human world 
of priestly redemption. Torrance holds to a high view 
of humanity: 
From the perspective oftheology, man is clearly 
made the focus point in the interrelations 
between God and the universe. He is given a 
special place within creation with a ruling and a 
priestly function to perform toward the rest of 
created reality. AIl lines ofrationality and order, 
of purpose and fulfillment in the creation 
converge on him as man of God and man of 
science and depend upon his destiny. 
But unlike others, Torrance does not stop here with the 
familiar theme of theological self-congratulation. He 
couples his high view of humanity with a strong view of 
human responsibility: 
this priestly role of man must take on a 
redemptive form - that is how we should view 
man's relationship to nature. It is his task to 
save the natural order through remedial and 
integrative activity, bringing back order where 
there isdisorderand restoring peace where there 
is disharmony.24 
In short: the representative function of priesthood is the 
presentation and actualization of God's suffering service 
in the world. 
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Second, I want to suggest that Christ-like priest-
hood is necessarily socrificial. But what or whom is to 
be sacrificed? Archbishop Leighton, and others before 
and after him, have understood this sacrificial work in 
terms of the offering of thanksgiving. "[I]n this lower 
world," writes Leighton, "it is Man alone that is made 
capable of observing the glory of God, and ofoffering 
him praises." John Zizioulas, in a recent lecture, develops 
the point further when he describes the priest as the one 
who "refers the world back to [its] Creator."lS Now, I 
do not want to deny that the offering of thanksgiving, 
even on behalf of other creatures, is an important aspect 
of priesthood - though I would have to say that it is 
not clear to me that other creatures do not praise and 
commune with theirCreator in their own way. But leaving 
that question aside, it seems insufficient to allow 
thanksgiving as the sole or major definition of what the 
priest has to offer. 
Neither do I think that the sacriftcial aspect of 
priesthood is adequately or properly characterized in 
terms of sacrificing other forms of life such as animals. 
"The killing of animals," writes Karl Barth, "when 
performed with the permission of God and by His 
command, is a priestly act ofeschatological character."26 
But whatever may be the meaning and historical 
significance of the forms of animal sacrifice in the 
Old Testament - and about this I recognize that there is 
no little discussion27 - it seems to me very difficult 
indeed to reconcile the spirit of Christ-like sacrifice 
with animal sacrifice, and for two reasons. The first is 
that Christian sacrifice is primarily to do with the 
offering of life and especially love - rather than blood 
(although Good Friday is real enough), and second, 
the internal logic of Christ's sacriftce is the sacrifice 
of the higher for the lower and not the reverse. It does 
not seem irrelevant to point out here that Jesus did not 
sacrifice animals and, arguably, by his cleansing of the 
Temple indicates more than an ambivalent relationship 
to this practice.28 
But the central point I want to make here is this: The 
priestly work of sacrifice is best characterized by the 
offering of self-costly love as exemplified by Christ 
himself. To make this point clearer, I want to draw on 
another New Testament image, this time not that of 
Christ as the suffering servant in Phillippians but, 
rather, the image of the world in a state of child-birth 
in Romans. The creation groans in travail because it is 
subject not by its own will to "bondage and decay." 
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"For the creation waits with eager longing for the 
revealing of the sons of God," writes St Paul, "because 
the creation itself will be set free...and obtain the glorious 
liberty of the children of God.''29 What does it mean for 
humans to exercise a priestly role of redemption? Quite 
simply: it concerns the releasing ofcreation from futility, 
from suffering and pain and worthlessness. This, I want 
to suggest. is the divine wade of redemption to which 
humans are called by the power of the Spirit It is the 
liberation of creation itself from decay and suffering -
perltaps in some ways the most fundamental liberation 
of all. Such a perspective challenges at root the notion 
that human responsibility in the world extends only to 
serving and protecting our own species. Keith Ward's 
paraphrase of Genesis 1, namely that "man" is made a 
"god" in creation and that creatures "should serve him" 
needs rethinking.30 I suggest it should be that humans 
given lordship or God-like power should serve creation. 
To reiterate: The inner logic of Christ's lordship is the 
sacrifice of the higher for the lower; not the reverse. If 
the humility of God is costly and essential, why should 
ours be less so? 
Strangely enough it is Nietzsche who in a most 
uncharacteristic piece of writing seems to point in my 
direction. ''The deeper minds of all ages have had pity 
for animals," he writes, "because they suffer from life 
and have not the power to turn the sting of their suffering 
against themselves, and understand their being 
metaphysically.''31 According to Nietzsche, nature needs 
the philosopher and the artist "to strive thereby for the 
completionofnature." Butnature, according to Nietzsche, 
needs - not only the artist and the philosopher - but 
also the saint 
In him the ego is melted away, and the suffering 
of his life is, practically, no longer felt as 
individual, but as the spring of the deepest 
sympathy and intimacy with all living 
creatures...the attainment. at length, of the high 
state of man after which all nature is striving, 
that she may be delivered from herself.32 
And it is concretely in the lives of many saints that 
we see prefigured this vision of the higher state of nature 
to which Nietzsche refers. Of the many examples one 
could give I choose simply one example from St Isaac 
the Syrian: "What is a charitable heart?" he asks, and 
replies as follows: 
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It is a heart which is burning with love for the 
whole creation, for men, for the birds, for the 
beasts, for the demons - for all creatures. He 
who has such a heart cannot see or call to mind 
a creature without his eyes being filled with 
tears by reason of the immense compassion 
which seizes his heart; a heart which is softened 
and can no longer bear to see or learn from 
others of any suffering, even the smallest pain 
being inflicted upon a creature. That is why 
such a man never ceases to pray for the 
animals.... He will pray even for the reptiles, 
moved by the infInite pity which reigns in the 
hearts of those who are becoming united 
with God.33 
This last sentence goes some way to encapsulate the 
point I want to stress: It is not just that sensitivity to 
suffering is, or should be, a characteristic of priesthood 
or saintliness, though I think it should be. It is rather 
that sensitivity to suffering (and with it compassion, 
empathy, mercy, loving forgiveness) are the hallmarks 
of priesthood itself. Only when we can say that we 
too have entered - however fleetingly - into the 
suffering ofChrist in the suffering ofall creatures can we 
claim to have entered into the priestly nature of our 
humanity. More even than that, for the goal of our 
priestly humanity as I see it is not, as St Isaac reminds 
us, simply passive. We are to be active in prayer and 
deed to ensure that we reflect not justChrist-like feeling 
for the suffering of the world butalso Christ-like healing. 
We are not called to be mere spectators of the world of 
suffering but active co-participants with God the Holy 
Spirit in its redemption. 
IV 
I turn now to my fourth section. My starting point 
was the question: In what way, ifany, are humans unique 
in the creation God has made? The argument I have 
sketched has been as follows: We need three shifts in our 
thinking. First, away from the idea that if God suffers at 
all, this suffering takes place solely within the human 
species, to the view that God suffers in all suffering 
creatures. Second, a shift away from a narrow 
conception of priesthood as largely or exclusively 
concerned with God and humanity - to the view that 
priesthood is a participation in God's redeeming presence 
in the world. And third, a shift away from the idea 
that the characteristics of priesthood - namely 
representation and sacrifIce - can be detailed in a 
wholly human-centred way without involving the 
exercise of Christ-like power and service to the whole 
of creation. 
The answer I want to give then to my opening 
question is this: The uniqueness of humanity consists in 
its ability to become the servant species, to exercise its 
full humanity as co-participants and co-workers with 
God in the redemption ofthe world. This view challenges 
the traditional notions that the world was made simply 
for human use or pleasure, that its purpose consists in 
serving the human species, or that the world exists 
largely in an instrumentalist relationship to human 
beings. Only the most tenacious holding on to the 
passibility of God may be sufficient to redeem us from 
our own profoundly arrogant humanistic conceptions of 
our place in the universe. 
It is important, however, to spell out the implications 
of the doctrine of priestly service which I have espoused. 
The first is that humanity can have no right to regard 
sentient creatures especially as simply means to their 
ends. Animals are not simply here for our use, and to use 
animals at all incurs a very great responsibility. I agree 
with the principle commended by Stephen R. L. Clark 
that it is wrong to be the cause of avoidable injury. But I 
would, perhaps, go further. To make animals suffer for 
human purposes is not just morally wrong, it is an act of 
the gravest faithlessness. Humphry Primatt, who wrote 
the most impressive theological treatise on animals, got 
it right when he wrote that: 
We may pretend to what religion we please; but 
cruelty is atheism. We may make our boast of 
Christianity, but cruelty is infidelity. We may 
trust to our orthodoxy, but cruelty is the worst 
of heresies.34 
'That we now as a matterofcourse use sentientbeings 
in ways that cause them harm and suffering as laboratory 
tools, as units of production in farming, as objects of 
sport and entertainment, is a sign that we have lost not 
just a sense of our priestly humanity but a sufficient 
conception of the generosity of God revealed in Jesus 
Christ All this is not to deny that we - indeed all nature 
- is caught up in the structures of disorder of which 
Torrance speaks.35 Neither is it to deny - in my favourite 
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line from Albert Schweitzer - that a clean conscience is 
a figment of the imagination or as he actually puts it "an 
invention of the devil. ''36 Neither is it to suppose that we 
can easily tum to live in some Edenite hannony with 
other creatures. I accept that we are compromised and 
that we have difficult choices to make. 
Nevertheless, I want to suggest that it is here we 
may sense the possibility of living other than we do, 
that we should reflect upon the fact that Christian 
priesthood is sacrificial, costly priesthood. It cannot be 
sufficient merely to have a negative vision of what we 
should do to prevent suffering in the world. We need 
positive vision of how we can take upon ourselves the 
suffering of the world and transform it by the power of 
the Holy Spirit. We need to experiment in ways of 
liberation rather than always assuming that human 
interest, narrowly conceived, always comes frrst To 
give but one controversial example: It may be that the 
truly Christian view of the morality of experimentation 
begins not by asking how much suffering we can 
legitimately inflict upon animals but rather should we 
not elect to bear for ourselves whatever ills may flow 
from not experimenting upon animals rather than using 
our power to exploit the weak in our own favour. All 
this has an urgency which in previous generations we 
failed to appreciate. For our ruthless, un-gentle treatment 
of the natural world has ushered in a cognizance ofcertain 
limits to exploitation. Extinct species, like dead nature 
itself, can no longer be exploited. It seems to me that 
Christians have an opportunity in the present circum-
stances to show what it means to live as though we believe 
in a generous loving God by living that generosity towards 
nonhuman creatures. 
v 
I now turn to my fifth, and final, section and briefly 
consider four objections to my argument 
The first queries my whole train of argument by 
suggesting that I have simply overlooked the powerful 
"humans come first" tradition within Christianity. 
According to the Linzey view, it is claimed, we shall end 
up being more concerned about suffering hens than 
suffering humans. 
I agree with this objection if it means that the 
suffering of humans - as well as the suffering of non-
humans - should be the subject of the serving and 
sacrificial priesthood. Nothing in my argument should 
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weaken concern for the healing of suffering humanity. 
Nevertheless, it is no longer clear to me that we can 
make an absolute distinction between one kind of 
suffering and another, either that of a member ofanother 
class, race, sex or - I would add - species. Neither is it 
clear to me that we can in each and every situation claim 
that human suffering is more important than any other 
kind of suffering. Indeed, I want to suggest that the 
attempt to place human well-being in a special and 
absolute category of its own is one of the reasons why 
other earthly creatures - indeed, the earth itself -
remains in a desperate state of travail, a travail so great 
that its destruction - in part. ifnot as a whole - seems 
inevitable. In other words, exclusive moral preoccu-
pation with our own species is part of the problem itself 
rather than its solution. We should face the fact that 
years of Christian anthropocentricity (of a bad sort) has 
helped lead us to the environmental crisis we now 
encounter. In short, we have to redress the balance and 
appreciate that humans are not just linked to nature, we are 
part of nature. 
Behind these eyes 
lies the dlwn of lime. 
You mike me I monster 
or I Joke. 
Lock me up so you un sure Ind Ilu,h. 
I look blck with ,relt Sldness 
for I know your PISt 
Ind I see your destiny. 
I do not hlte you. 
I 1m ,entle; I 1m 10YII. 
I blVe strenGth 
beyond this ,llnt's body. 
I 1m stronG in spirit. 
My solemn laze revells the truth. 
When you murder me 
you Ire killin, you. 
When you imprison my soul 
you destroy your future. 
Kathleen Malley 
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The second objection is that I have effectively 
reduced theology to ethics by simply redefining the 
essential characteristics ofpriesthood in ethical tenos. 
Some fonos of this objection have my sympathy. 
John Zizioulas has recently stressed the limitations of a 
response to the ecological crisis which simply places all 
its hq>es in ethics. "Whether enforced by State legislation 
or taughtor instructed by Churches, academic institutions, 
etc., it is ethics that seems to contain the hopes of 
humankind in the present situation," he writes. And yet 
(he reminds us) "ethics, whether enforced or free, 
presupposes other more existential motivations in order 
to function.'0J7 It is difficult to deny that Zizioulas is 
right here. The appeal to ethics, by itself, is insufficient 
Yet it is also very understandable. Forcenturies Christians 
have kept our relations with the nonhuman out of the 
ethical sphere, and so it is perhaps notaltogethersurprising 
that their inclusion is now seen as a priority. 
However, I am not one of those who think that 
salvation lies in ethics alone. Spiritually unenlightened 
humanity - especially one that is over-eonfident of its 
own humanism - can bea causeofmoral darkness. The 
approach I have outlined is far from naive ethicism. But 
it may be construed as an attack upon what we have had 
a surplus ofin the Christian tradition, namely non-ethical 
or anti-ethical theology. I suggest that we need a way of 
combining the two - theology and ethics - in a much 
clearer way than heretofore. Moral theology is a more 
acceptable tenn; asceticalormystical theology even better. 
But, at a deeper level, what this objection signifies is 
a divorce between divine activity and human response 
which is starkly perilous at the present time. The 
theological challenge is how we can understand the divine 
work of passibility and redemption already operative 
within creation through the workofthe HolySpirit When 
we have such a conception we shall best be able to fully 
appreciate the necessity of human response to, indeed, 
participation in, that work itself. 
The third objection takes us back to my initial thesis 
concerning the passibility of God. How can God suffer 
eternally and also at the same time offer us liberation 
from suffering which is the central hope of the Gospel? 
In short If God suffers in creation, how can God also 
redeem us from that suffering? 
Again, I have no little sympathy for this objection, 
which I once heldand defended myself. Butthe weakness 
of the argument - it now seems to me - is in its view 
that God cannot both suffer and redeem that suffering at 
Between the Species 
one and the same time. The best, perhaps the only, model 
we can have is that of the incarnation itself. For if it is 
possible for God in Christ to enter into the suffering of 
the world, and yet transform that suffering into joy, why 
should this capacity be limited in time and space to one 
event only? I posit that Thibault was right What is seen 
in Christ is one instance of the perpetual transfonoation 
of suffering happening throughout time. 
The fourth objection holds - perhaps on a lighter 
note - that if we take the view that the higher should 
have a greater concern for the lower, we shall end up 
having as much - if not more - concern for asparagus 
or cabbage or carrots than for human beings. 
I do not think so. For the stress in my argument has 
been on suffering creation. Despite popular notions of 
talking plants and sentient vegetables, there is actually 
no evidence that such creatures experience pain. Though, 
of course, there may be some areas of difficulty and 
doubt, I can see no good reason why these should prevent 
us from behaving in a priestly manner to those beings 
whose capacity for suffering is beyond reasonable doubt. 
That we may, however, discover sensitivity and sentience 
outside the human species - in what are to us unlikely 
place - only reinforces the fact that God has created an 
amazingly sensitive and delicate world and that wherever 
we go we should tread gently. 
It is important, however, that my argument from 
suffering should be understood. I do not deny that there 
are other important characteristics, apart from sentiency, 
which should be valued or conserved. My stress here is 
that the special capacity for suffering which we share 
with so many nonhuman creatures is theologically 
significant if we subscribe to the doctrine of a suffering, 
passible God. God may be injured or harmed in creation 
in a variety of ways - at least conceivably - but none 
more directly than through the infliction of suffering. 
In conclusion, you may recall Abelard's reaction to 
Thibault's doctrine of divine passibility. "The 
Patripassian heresy," he muttered "mechanically." "But, 
o God, if it were true.. .It must be. At least, there is 
something at the back of it that is true." Then Abelard 
went on: "And ifwe could fmd it - it would bring back 
the whole world." At first sight it might seem an 
amazingly presumptious claim that the recovery of the 
insight of divine passibility could lead to a recovery of 
the whole world. And yet is it purely coincidental that 
its contrary view, namely the doctrine of divine 
impassibility, has triumphed and flourished in Christian 
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centuries in which theology about the world - and 
especiallyourresponsibility for it - seems to havealmost 
entirely evaporated? It may be that here, as elsewhere, 
our doctrine of God has been much more significant for 
the salvation of the world than we might have thought 
possible. Abelard, I feel sure, would have approved of 
the mystical theology contained in these moving lines 
from Schweitzer's autobiography: "I could not but feel 
with a sympathy full of regret all the pain that I saw 
around me, not only that of men, but that of the whole 
creation. From this community of suffering I have never 
tried to withdraw myself. It seemed to me a matter of 
course that we should all take our share of the burden of 
suffering which lies upon the world:'38 
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